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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines empirically whether democracies allocate fewer resources to the military than 
dictatorships do. It employs a panel of up to 112 countries over the period 1960-2000 to estimate a 
standard demand for military spending model. While papers on the determinants of military 
spending generally include democracy as a control variable, with a few exceptions, it is not the focus 
of their enquiry. This paper addresses resulting problems in the existing literature concerning data 
quality and the appropriate measurement of key variables, as well as the question of causality 
between military spending and democracy. It finds that democracies spend less on the military as a 
percentage of GDP than autocracies do and that causality runs from regime type to military 
spending. 
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I .  INTRODUCTION 
The 1990s saw the spread of democracy to many countries, particularly in the former Communist 
bloc, but also throughout the rest of the developing world. It brought with it an easing of tension in 
international relations and ended history’s greatest arms race. It has been argued in the political 
science literature that democratisation has a demilitarising effect. This idea dates back to the 
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1795, p. 94), who argued in his essay Perpetual Peace that “standing 
armies (miles perpetuus) shall be abolished in course of time", as countries increasingly embrace the 
ideas of liberalism.  
It follows that democracies should spend less on the military than autocracies do. The objective of 
this paper is to examine this hypothesis. I model my investigation on the empirical literature on the 
demand for military expenditure. While papers in this genre generally include democracy as a 
                                                             
1 I would like to thank my PhD supervisor, Ron Smith for his advice and support with this research. 
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control variable, with a few exceptions, it is not the focus of their enquiry. Hence, problems in 
empirically assessing the effect of democracy on military expenditures have been overlooked. In 
particular, problems concerning data quality and the appropriate measurement of the key variables, 
as well as the question of causality have not been addressed.  
This paper investigates empirically whether democracies have lower military expenditures than 
autocracies do. It employs a panel of up to 112 countries over the period 1960-2000 to estimate a 
standard demand for military spending, controlling for a number of economic and strategic 
variables, while emphasising the effect of democracy. In particular, it attempts to address the above 
mentioned problems in the existing literature. This paper is structures as follow. First, I introduce the 
theoretical reasons for expecting democracies to allocate few resources to the military than 
autocracies do. Subsequently, I review the literature on the demand for military spending, focusing 
in particular on findings regarding the effect of democracy. Next, I briefly introduce the data and 
methodology employed in this paper, before turning to the empirical results.  
Initially, I estimate a standard demand for military expenditure model to capture the effect of 
democracy. However, as I shall explain below, there are reasons to believe that causality between 
military spending and democracy may run the other way. Thus, I also estimate at 2SLS model and 
follow up with a Granger causality test. 
 
 
I I .  THEORY 
There are several reasons why one might expect democracies to spend less on the military than 
autocracies. One line of reasoning suggests that democratic leaders are accountable to the broader 
public which tends to prioritize social spending over spending on the military. Rosh (1988, pp. 676-
681) argues that this is because “the degree of openness of the political process with regard to 
debates on resource extraction and allocations serves to limit both the public economy and the 
military burden of a given state”.  He hypothesizes that “the greater the extent a country is governed 
by the rule of law, where decisions as to allocations are debated openly by elected representatives 
and alternative priorities are able to compete in this open arena, the smaller may be a state's 
military burden”. Hewitt (1992, p. 131) also argues that “the policies of democracies are closer to 
the desires of the public, in which case the higher military spending in countries dominated by other 
forms of government would reflect a greater preference for military expenditure by the leadership 
relative to the population”.  
Nordhaus, Russet and Oneal (2012, p. 498) restate this argument: “Autocrats are able to extract 
private goods from rents associated with a successful use of military force internationally and 
impose much of the cost of fighting, and the price of any failures, on the general population”. 
Kimenyi and Mbaku (1995) make a similar argument: in dictatorships, competition for rents is 
dominated by groups who have a comparative advantage in violence, whereas in democracies, 
where rent-seeking by the military is confined to political lobbying, military expenditures will be 
lower.  
Another reason why democracies might be expected to have lower military spending is that they are 
less likely to go to war. The so-called Democratic Peace Theory, dating back to to the Philosopher 
Immanuel Kant (1795), argues that democracies do not go to war with other democracies (see also, 
Doyle 1986; Russet 1993). In addition, scholars have presented evidence that democratic leaders are 
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more risk-averse towards war in general than dictators are. Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson 
and Smith (1999) argue that because they risk being voted out of office if they lose, democratic 
leaders are more careful to enter a war. Jackson and Morelli (2007, p 1354) suggest that while in 
democracies leaders face the same costs and benefits from war as the average citizen does, 
dictators gain disproportionately more from war. They reason that “in an authoritarian regime, it 
may be that a leader can keep a disproportionate share of the gains from a war. It may also be that 
the leader sees other gains from war, in personal recognition or power”. Dictatorships’ higher 
propensity for war will be reflected in their higher defense budgets.  
Finally, military spending may be higher in dictatorships because the dictators often lack popular 
legitimacy and rely instead (at least in part) on the military to maintain power. Not only are 
autocracies more likely to experience violent uprising, they are also more incline than democracies 
to meet it with large-scale force (see, for example, Goldsmith 2003). However, Acemoglu, Ticchi and 
Vindigni (2010, p. 2) argue that a powerful military is a “double edged sword”. On the one hand, a 
more powerful military is more effective in putting down uprisings. On the other hand, a more 
powerful military is better positioned to orchestrate a military coup.  Thus, to ensure its loyalty, a 
dictator must make greater concessions to the military, which will be reflected in a higher defense 
budget. 
 
 
I I I .  L ITERATURE REVIEW 
The research on the determinants of military expenditure is substantial, dating back to the 1980s 
and before. While a number of studies consider the effect of regime type, barring a few exceptions, 
this has not been the focus. Moreover, with the development of more sophisticated econometric 
techniques and availability of more reliable data, many studies are now outdated. In this section, I 
review some of the more recent papers. 
Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003) investigate the demand for military spending in developing 
countries using a panel of 98 countries from 1981 to 1997. While regime type is not the focus of this 
study, they do control for the effect of democracy using the POLITY98 index. Estimating a static fixed 
effects model, the authors find that a one unit increase in democracy leads to a 0.014 unit decrease 
in military burden. Using a dynamic panel, however, they find that democracy is insignificant. 
Similarly, Goldsmith (2003) investigates the determinant of military spending, but studies a wider 
sample: he assembles “an extensive dataset, covering all states in the international system (as listed 
by COW) for just over a century, from 1886-1989” (Goldsmith 2003, p. 560). He finds that regime 
type has a significant negative effect on the defense burden around -0.002. This result is robust 
across all models (including fixed effects). Collier and Hoeffler (2007) focus on the effect of arms 
races on military spending. Nevertheless, they also find that democracy, as measured by the Polity III 
index, has a significant negative effect on military spending. Using global data for the period 1960–
99, they find that “a dictatorial society will spend 2% of GDP more on the military, controlling for 
other characteristics, than a fully democratic society” (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, p. 10) (Most 
recently, Nordhaus, Oneal, and Russett (2012), in considering the effects of the international security 
environment on national military expenditures, find a semi-elasticity of military expenditures with 
respect to democracy of -0.03. “These results were less robust than [their] estimates of the impact 
of the threat environment, but they indicate clearly that democracies spend substantially less on the 
military than do autocracies” (Nordhaus, et al 2012, p. 505). 
4 
 
To the best of my knowledge, only two studies focus explicitly on the effect of democracy on military 
expenditure. Yildrim and Sezgin (2005) use a panel of 92 countries for the period 1987 – 1997 and 
find that in a random effects model an increase in democracy decreases military burden by 0.27 
units. However, once fixed effects are included, the effect of democracy is no longer significant. 
Fordham and Walker (2005) use data “a wide a range of states since 1816” (Fordham and Walker 
2005, p. 141) and find support for the liberal argument that democracy has a demilitarizing effect. 
Moreover, the paper by Kimenyi and Mbaku (1995) is the only paper that accounts for the possibility 
of reverse causality between military expenditure and democracy. Focusing on a cross-section of 87 
developing countries in the year 1980 and using an instrumental variable approach, they find a 
negative relationship between military expenditures as a percentage of government expenditure 
and Bollen’s Political Democracy Index.  
The above review of the literature evidences that democracy appears to have a negative effect on 
military spending. This paper attempts to update and expand, as well as address a number of 
shortcomings in these studies. Firstly, the quality of the military expenditure data in some of the 
above studies is questionable. This thesis contends that the best data on military expenditure is that 
published by SIPRI. However, SIPRI itself states that the data found in yearbooks prior to 1988 is 
unusable. While some studies (for example, Collier and Hoeffler, 2007) simply ignore this advice, 
other studies avoid this problem by focusing their analysis on the period after 1988 (for example, 
Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2003). Doing so disregards information prior to 1988. Studies focusing on 
longer time spans tend to employ COW data, which is generally considered less reliable. Clearly 
there is a trade-off between quality of data and richness of analysis that comes from studying a 
longer time-period. I agree with Nordhaus et al (2012) that the most reasonable approach is to focus 
on the period 1960 to present and combine COW data with SIPRI data. Thus, the present analysis not 
only updates and expands upon existing studies on the determinants of military expenditure; it also 
employs higher quality data. 
Secondly, largely because the effect of regime type was not the primary focus of the majority of the 
studies review above, the question of how democracy is best measured is not addressed in this 
literature. The Freedom House and Polity indices, which have been the preferred measures in this 
literature, have been widely criticized (see, for example, Gleditsch and Ward 1997; Cheibub, Gandhi 
and Veerland 2010). These continuous scale measures have been condemned for conflating 
important differences between regime types. For example, Gleditsch and Ward (1997, p.380) argue 
that “vastly different temporal, spatial, and social contexts support the same autocracy scale value”. 
Critics of these measures propose categorical measures, which group countries into categories such 
as democracy/autocracy as the alternative. However, it can be argued that categorical measures of 
regime type equally obscure important information. Categorizing countries into either democracies 
or autocracies implicitly assumes that all democracies/autocracies are equal. It seems reasonable to 
argue that some democracies are more democratic than others, etc. In addition the question arises 
of how many categories regimes should be classified into. While Cheibub et al. (2010) propose a 
dichotomous measure, research on democracies and dictatorships has found that so-called 
anocracies/hybrid regimes/semi-democracies behave differently from both full democracies and 
autocracies. Moreover, empirical studies have found that the inclusion of a third middle category 
makes a significant difference for results (see, for example, Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen 
and O'Halloran 2006). In this paper, I address the question of choice of measure by using two types 
of measures: a discrete ordinal variable (Polity IV) and a categorical measure (PRC). 
Finally, as mentioned above, with the exception of Kimenyi and Mbaku (1995), none consider the 
possibility of reverse causality. Military spending may reflect the degree of political power of the 
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military, and a politically powerful military may, in turn, hinder the transition to and consolidation of 
democracy. This argument is laid out in Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vingini (2008, p. 4): 
"If the elite create a powerful military to prevent democratization, then the military also 
plays an important role in democratic politics until it is reformed, and such reform is not 
instantaneous. In particular, we show that faced with a powerful military, a newly-
emerging democratic regime will either need to make costly concessions or face a high 
probability of a coup. This coup threat disappears once the military is reformed. 
Interestingly however, it is the anticipation that the military will be reformed as soon as 
the opportunity arises that makes it difficult to control the military during the early 
phases of a democratic regime - because this creates a commitment problem, making it 
impossible for democratic governments to make credible promises to compensate 
soldiers for not taking actions against democracy". 
 
 Kimenyi and Mbaku’s investigation is limited to cross-sectional study of the year 1980, and can thus 
hardly be considered definitive. This paper investigates this issue in more depth. 
 
 
IV.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
DATA 
This paper uses a panel of up to 112 countries over the period 1960-2000. The arguably best data on 
military expenditures is supplied by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 
Regrettably, SIPRI does not provide data before 1988. However, years before then are interesting for 
my research, as they yield so many more examples of dictatorships. The Correlates of War (COW) 
National Material Capabilities database supplies data on military expenditures from 1960 onwards. 
Unfortunately, the Correlates of War project is less meticulous about documenting its data collection 
process than the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute is, and is thus generally 
considered less reliable. Following Nordhaus, Oneal and Russet (2012), I use COW data from 1960 to 
1987 and SIPRI data from 1988 to 2000. COW data are in current USD. I transform them into 
constant USD using the US CPI with 2005 as the base year. SIPRI data are in constant 2008 USD. I 
transform all data into percentages of GDP using GDP figures (in constant 2000 USD) from the World 
Bank World Development Indicators to get a measure of military burden. To account for potential 
discrepancies between the two data sets, I include a dummy which equals 1 when the source is SIPRI 
and zero when the source is COW. This dummy must be interpreted carefully. In addition to picking 
up differences in the sources, it will pick up a "Cold War effect" because the SIPRI data corresponds 
with the post-Cold War era. As an additional robustness check, I run separate regressions on the 
SIPRI and COW datasets alone to check whether my results hold. 
I use two measures of democracy: Marshall and Jaggers (2002) Polity IV and Reich’s (2002) dataset 
of political regime change (PRC). The Polity scheme is a continuous scale measure that examines 
concurrent qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions. It consists of six 
component measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive 
authority, and political competition. The Polity Score ranks countries according to a 21-point scale 
ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Reich’s (2002) Political 
Regime Change is a categorical measure, which groups countries into autocracies (PRC=0), semi-
democracies (PRC=1) and democracies (PRC=2), according to the definitions outlined by Diamond, 
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Linz and Lipset (1990). The strength of this dataset lies in the fact that it is designed "specifically for 
the purpose of classifying regimes, providing a single, categorical measure of regime type, instead of 
leaving the researcher the task of designing such a variable from the data that may not be easily or 
meaningfully transformed into a categorical measure" (Reich 2002, p. 18). 
Dummy variables on wars - internal and external - are from the Correlates of War Project. Data on 
GDP per capita (in constant 2000 USD) and total population are taken from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators; and data on openness, defined as exports plus imports divided by GDP (in 
2005 constant US Dollars) are from the Penn World Tables.  
I transform military burden, GDP per capita, population, and openness into logs to scale down the 
variance and reduce the effect of outliers. Table 1 outlines the summary statistics for all variables. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
METHODOLOGY 
I estimated a standard demand for military expenditure model (see for example Dunne and Perlo-
Freeman, 2003). I regress the log of military burden on democracy (Polity IV or Reich), intrastate 
war, interstate war, log GDP per capita, log population and log openness.  
 
                                                                
                                                             
 
Internal and external wars pick up immediate threats. A country engaged in war will not only give 
greater priority to military spending as a matter of urgency, but will also need to restock arms and 
ammunition used in fighting (see, for example, Hewitt, 1992). 
GDP per capita is a measure of wealth, while population is a measure of size. While the former is 
expected to have a positive effect on military spending, the literature is divided on what effect the 
latter should have. While Kimenyi and Mbaku (1995) argue that larger countries require bigger 
defence forces, and Hewitt (1992) maintains that larger countries tend to be major regional or global 
military powers, Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003, p. 468) contend that “a large population is 
considered to offer some autonomous security in itself”. Moreover, countries with large populations 
may be more likely to rely on manpower, while small countries turn instead to high-tech weaponry, 
which is relatively more expensive.  
Openness is a proxy for economic integration. The rationale behind the inclusion of this variable is 
that the more open a country is, the more peaceful will be its relationships with other countries, and 
therefore the less need it has for defence spending. However, the opposite has been argued for 
developing countries: the level of economic integration may, in fact, be a source of discontent, as 
dependence on the world market renders their economies more vulnerable to fluctuations in world 
prices. In addition, the benefits of trade only accrue to certain groups (i.e. the elites). In anticipation 
of resulting internal dissent developing countries may become more militarized with increasing 
openness (Rosh, 1988).  It is worth noting that while it could be argued that the fact that arms trade 
is included by definition in total trade could lead to problems of simultaneity, it makes up such a 
small proportion of that this is unlikely to pose a problem. 
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The baseline model is a one-way fixed effects model estimated with the combined data from SIPRI 
and COW. I include a dummy in this regression to control for any differences between the two data 
sets. In addition, I control for time effects in a two-way fixed effects model. As mentioned above, I 
also run separate regressions on the SIPRI and COW datasets alone as additional robustness checks. I 
control for group-wise serial correlation and heteroscedasticity2 by reporting robust standard errors. 
I run two sets of regressions, first using Polity IV and second PRC as the measure of democracy. 
 
 
VI.  RESULTS  
POLITY IV  
Table 2 summarizes the results for regressions using Polity IV as the measure of democracy. Polity IV 
is significant and negatively correlated with military burden throughout all regressions, with the 
exception of regression 4, the two-way fixed effects model using SIPRI data only. In the baseline 
model, a one unit increase in Polity IV leads to a 2%3 decrease in military burden. The transformation 
of an absolute dictatorship into a perfect democracy results in a 40%4 decrease in military burden. 
Thus it can be said that democratization has a demilitarizing effect. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Intrastate war has a positive effect on military burden, which is significant in both the mixed sources 
and COW only regressions. In the baseline model, the presence of intrastate war raises the military 
burden of a country by a 62.58 %5 .  The lack of significance in the SIPRI only regressions is likely due 
to the shorter time period under study, a time period during which there were substantially fewer 
intrastate wars. Interstate war, on the other hand, though positive, is insignificant. Interstate war 
may be correlated with democracy, with fewer democracies going to war than dictatorships (as 
proposed by the democratic peace theory outlined above). This may explain why these results are 
insignificant.  
Log GDP per capita is consistently negative, but significant only in regressions 2, 3 and 6. Log 
population switches signs. This could be explained by population picking up trends in the one-way 
fixed effects model that are captured by the time fixed effects in the two-way fixed effects model.  
Moreover, this variable is insignificant (with the exception of regression 1). Trade appears to have a 
positive impact on military burden and is significant in the mixed sources regressions. However, in 
the SIPRI only and COW only regressions the significance disappears. This may be due to the 
problem of simultaneity, which, as mentioned above, is the result of the definition of data on 
imports and exports including arms trade. 
                                                             
2
 The presence of serial correlation is likely because the model under consideration is static. The presence of 
heteroscedasticity can be explained by the fact that the variability of military expenditures differs between 
countries. 
3
 Treating Polity IV as a continuous regressor, the interpretation of its coefficient, b, is that it is the partial 
derivative of ln(Y) with respect to X. So, 100*b (or 100*(-0.02)=-2) is the percentage change in Y for a 1 unit 
change in X, other things held equal. 
4 A transformation of an absolute dictatorship into a perfect is represented by a change in Polity IV from -10 to 
10, or a 20 unit increase. The effect of Polity IV on the log of military burden is thus calculated by multiplying 
the effect of a one unit increase (as shown in footnote 18) by 20. 
5
 If the intrastate war dummy switches from 0 to 1, the % impact of intrastate war on military burden is 
100[exp(0.486) – 1]=62.58. 
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Generally, the presence of year dummies does not change the results beyond a loss in statistical 
precision. However, in the mixed sources regressions some problems do appear: in addition to log 
population changing sign, the sign and size of the source dummy and the constant change too. Again 
this might be explained by trends, which are otherwise captured by the time fixed effects, being 
captured by the source dummy in the one-way fixed effects model. In particular, because the source 
dummy equals when the data sources is SIPRI, and SIPRI data roughly corresponds with the post-
Cold War period (1988-2000), it may be picking up post-Cold War effects. 
  
POLITICAL REGIME CHANGE 
Table 3 summarizes the results for regressions using Political Regime Change as the measure of 
democracy. The results are comparable in sign, size and significance to the results with Polity IV. PRC 
is significant and negatively correlated with military burden throughout all regressions, with the 
exception of regressions 2 and 6, the two-way fixed effects models using mixed sources and COW 
data only, respectively. In the baseline model, a change from autocracy to semi-democracy, or from 
semi-democracy to democracy leads to an approximately 9%6 decrease in military burden. This is 
further evidence that democratization has a demilitarizing effect. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
VII .  CAUSALITY  
In order to address the issue, raised above, of endogeneity or reverse causality of democracy, I 
estimate the model using two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS). Endogeneity biases the 
coefficient estimates. By applying the weak exogeneity assumption, which assumes that current and 
past values of the instruments are uncorrelated with the current period error, one can instrument 
democracy with a lag of itself (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, ch. 22). It is reasonable to assume that, 
in the absence of shocks, the level of democracy last year is correlated with the level of democracy 
this year. Furthermore, it is logical that the military burden today does not affect democracy 
yesterday, so that the lagged level of democracy is uncorrelated with the error7.  
If endogeneity is, indeed, a problem, one should expect the results from the 2SLS regressions to 
differ considerably from the results of the fixed effects model. Table 4 compares the results from the 
baseline model to those using 2SLS. The results are, in fact, very similar, suggesting that endogeneity 
is not a problem. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Nevertheless, the results from the 2SLS estimation are not entirely satisfactory because the model is 
only just-identified. It is more efficient to over-identify the model (Baum 2006, p. 191). Theoretically 
this could be done by including more instruments, particularly those that can be excluded from the 
right-hand side of the equation (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p. 757). However, the literature does 
not identify any such variables. In addition, one might test for endogeneity using a Hausman test. 
                                                             
6
 If PRC switches from 0 to 1, the % impact of democracy on military burden is 100[exp(-0.096) – 1]=-9.15. 
7 However, this requires that military burden is not serially correlated, which maybe unlikely. Thus, this 
appropriateness of this instrument should not be overstated. 
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However, this test is likely to have low power as the differences between OLS and 2SLS are very 
small. 
 
Following the example set by Harrison (1996), I double-check the direction of the relationship by 
testing for Granger causality. This is done by estimating the equation:  
 
                                                 
 
where ∆ indicates the first difference. X is said to Granger ‘cause’ y, if, using an F-test, one can reject 
the hypothesis that the βs are jointly equal to zero. By switching the dependent and independent 
variables in the above equation one can then test whether y also Granger ‘causes’ x. 
Table 5 summarizes the results from this test using Polity IV as the measure of democracy. In the 
regression with the first difference of military burden as the dependent variable, the null hypothesis 
that the differenced lags of democracy are jointly insignificant is rejected. Democracy can therefore 
be said to Granger ‘cause’ military burden. In the reversed regression, in which the first difference of 
democracy is the dependent variable, the null hypothesis that the differenced lags of military burden 
are jointly insignificant cannot be rejected. Military burden does not Granger ‘cause’ democracy. 
These results are consistent with those from the panel IV estimation. Therefore, it seems safe to 
conclude that the direction of causality flows from democracy to military burden. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined the relationship between military expenditures and democracy. This paper 
represents the first in depth investigation of this relationship. While papers on the determinants of 
military expenditures generally include democracy as a control variable, with a few exceptions, it is 
not the focus of their enquiry. Thus aspects of this relationship, in particular, problems concerning 
data quality, the appropriate measurement of the key variables, and the question of causality have 
been overlooked. This paper represents the first in depth investigation into these issues. It found 
that democracies spend less on the military as a percentage of GDP than autocracies do. The 
difference in spending is substantial: an absolute dictatorship spends around 40% more than a full 
democracy. Moreover, causality runs from democracy to military expenditure. 
These finding have interesting policy implications: they suggest that democratization has a 
demilitarizing effect. This could prove interesting in the world of development aid, in which there is 
much debate about how prescriptive aid organizations should be. With evidence regarding the 
positive effect of democracy on growth being mixed, and dictatorships like China successfully forging 
their own paths towards economic development, democracy promotion has come to be seen as 
Western-centric. The findings of this paper suggest a different reason why democratization may still 
be worth pursuing: it leads to lower military expenditures. Not only will this free up resources for 
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other areas of spending, such as health and education, it may also create a more peaceful 
environment. Both of these things are likely to be good for growth in the long-run. 
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APPENDIX A:  
TABLES 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Burden (SIPRI) 1341 4.160611 3.534496 0 50.24831 
Burden (COW) 4097 5.895802 10.23722 0 139.8255 
Burden (Mixed) 4134 5.86E+00 1.01E+01 0 1.40E+02 
Polity IV 5645 1.094774 7.447481 -10 10 
PRC 3877 .823317 .9293922 0 2 
Interstate war 4790 0.020042 0.140158 0 1 
Intrastate war 4791 0.08349 0.27665 0 1 
GDP per capita 4337 4.84E+03 7.15E+03 0.021254 4.65E+04 
Population 4797 3.29E+07 1.15E+08 41700 1.26E+09 
Openness 4595 65.97842 50.06869 4.262921 622.6263 
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Table 2. Regression results with Polity IV as measure of democracy 
 
Regression/Estimation Method 
Dependent 
variable is 
log military 
burden 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
One-way  
Fixed 
Effects 
Two-way  
Fixed 
Effects 
One-way  
Fixed 
Effects 
Two-way  
Fixed 
Effects 
One-way  
Fixed 
Effects 
Two-way  
Fixed 
Effects 
Mixed 
sources 
Mixed 
Sources SIPRI SIPRI COW COW 
Polity IV -0.02*** -0.015** -0.012* -0.010 -0.029*** -0.017*** 
 
(-0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Interstate 
war 
0.15 0.165 0.059 0.044 0.122 0.143 
(0.113) (0.112) (0.068) (0.070) (0.124) (0.115) 
Intrastate 
war 
0.486*** 0.373*** 0.094 0.093 0.532*** 0.405*** 
(0.096) (0.083) (0.081) (0.084) (0.094) (0.082) 
Log GDP pc -0.164 -0.464* -0.518** -0.393 -0.241 -0.429* 
 
(0.235) (0.253) (0.246) (0.262) (0.214) (0.239) 
Log 
population 
0.346*** -0.373 -0.415 0.135 0.129 -0.088 
(0.13) (0.240) (0.310) (0.526) (0.124) (0.241) 
Log 
Openness 
0.360*** 0.235** -0.031 0.034 0.183 0.165 
(0.112) (0.107) (0.139) (0.155) (0.111) (0.110) 
Source -0.294*** 0.0219 - - - - 
 
-0.078 (.1363) - - - - 
Constant -4.468** 8.961* 11.981*** 1.847 0.182 4.523 
 
(2.154) (4.94) (4.293) (8.858) (1.848) (4.842) 
Year 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 N 3891 3891 1248 1248 3874 3874 
Groups 112 112 107 107 111 111 
R-Sq within 0.1117 0.2108 0.119 0.1459 0.0918 0.2144 
R-Sq btw 0.049 0.0023 0.0055 0.0067 0.062 0.0235 
R-Sq overall 0.0654 0.0078 0.004 0.0078 0.0732 0.0432 
AIC 6309.724 5929.125 126.257 111.605 6494.388 6012.679 
Robust standard errors in ();*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
15 
 
Table 3. Regression results with PRC as measure of democracy 
  Regression/Estimation Method 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent 
variable is 
log military 
burden 
 
One-way  
Fixed 
Effects 
Two-way  
Fixed 
Effects 
One-way  
Fixed 
Effects 
Two-way  
Fixed 
Effects 
One-way  
Fixed 
Effects 
Two-way  
Fixed 
Effects 
Mixed 
sources 
Mixed 
Sources SIPRI SIPRI COW COW 
PRC -0.096** -0.074 -0.135*** -0.124*** -0.177*** -0.068 
 
(0.046) (0.051) (0.044) (0.042) (0.047) (0.049) 
Interstate 
war 
0.134 0.139 0.042 0.039 0.107 0.116 
(0.119) (0.119) (0.061) (0.064) (0.129) (0.121) 
Intrastate 
war 
0.46*** 0.364*** 0.103 0.108 0.484*** 0.378*** 
(0.096) (0.086) (0.081) (0.084) (0.096) (0.084) 
Log GDP pc -0.157 -0.505* -0.428 -0.307 -0.218 -0.486* 
 
(0.25) (0.265) (0.266) (0.278) (0.223) (0.249) 
Log 
population 
0.395*** -0.46* -0.58* -0.175 0.138 -0.13 
(0.133) (0.252) (0.364) (0.538) (0.126) (0.262) 
Log 
Openness 
0.389*** 0.247** -0.069 -0.022 0.195 0.172 
(0.114) (0.109) (0.151) (0.172) (0.119) (0.113) 
Source -0.330*** -0.06 - - - - 
 
(0.079) (0.153) - - - - 
Constant -5.504** 10.817** 16.125*** 6.534 0.019 5.592 
 
(2.248) (5.361) (5.188) (9.371) (1.944) (5.435) 
Year 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 N 3446 3446 966 966 3433 3433 
Groups 102 102 95 95 101 101 
R-Sq within 0.1154 0.2136 0.1748 0.1926 0.078 0.2086 
R-Sq 
between 0.0535 0.0018 0.002 0.0036 0.0738 0.0252 
R-Sq overall 0.0707 0.0057 0.0012 0.0027 0.0758 0.0369 
AIC 5477.466 5149.676 -91.143 -90.18 5624.69 5178.471 
Robust standard errors in ();*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. 2SLS regression results 
Dependent 
variable is log 
military 
burden 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
One-way 
Fixed Effects 2SLS 
One-way 
Fixed Effects 2SLS 
Polity IV Polity IV PRC PRC 
Democracy -0.02*** -0.023*** -0.096** -0.145*** 
 
(-0.006) (0.006) (0.046) (0.045) 
Interstate war 0.15 0.134 0.134 0.116 
 
(0.113)  (0.113) (0.119) (0.127) 
Intrastate war 0.486*** 0.495*** 0.46*** 0.474*** 
 
(0.096)  (0.099)  (0.096)  (0.098) 
Log GDP pc -0.164 -0.223 -0.157 -0.216 
 
(0.235) (0.240) (0.25)  (0.231) 
Log 
population 
0.346*** 0.275** 0.395*** 0.325*** 
(0.13) (0.131) (0.133) (0.118) 
Log Openness 0.360*** 0.369*** 0.389*** 0.396*** 
 
(0.112) (0.105) (0.114) (0.104) 
Source -0.294***  -0.260*** -0.330*** -0.301*** 
 
-0.078 (0.077) (0.079) (0.070) 
Constant -4.468** -2.929 -5.504**  -3.774** 
  (2.154) (2.145) (2.248) (1.806) 
N 3891 3821 3446 3379 
Groups 112 112 102 102 
R-Sq within 0.1117 0.1168 0.1154 0.1196 
R-Sq between 0.049 0.0461 0.0535 0.0498 
R-Sq overall 0.0654 0.0596 0.0707 0.0652 
Robust standard errors in ();*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 5. Granger causality 
Polity IV→Military burden Military burden → Polity IV 
(F-test)¹ (F-test)² 
3.86* 1.11 
[0.0241] [0.3321] 
P-value in [] 
 ¹ Tests for the joint significance of the differenced lagged values 
of democracy on the first difference of military burden. 
² Tests for the joint significance of the differenced lagged values 
of military burden on the first difference of democracy. 
Null hypothesis: X does NOT Granger cause Y. * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis. 
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